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Abstract
We replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. (2006) experiment on choice
under uncertainty with 30 Yale undergraduates, where subjects make 200 pair-
wise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries. Inferences about the in-
dependence of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity are derived from
estimation of a mixed logit model, where the choice probabilities are functions
of two random eﬀects: the proxies for risk-aversion and ambiguity-aversion.
Our principal empirical ﬁnding is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that risk and ambiguity are independent in economic choice under uncertainty.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the hypothesized independence of the neural mech-
anisms governing economic choices under risk and ambiguity, suggested by the
double dissociation-fMRI study reported in Huettel et al.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Knight and Keynes in their classic monographs oﬀer two independent but overlapping
discussions of estimating probabilities for decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
In this regard Keynes is probably best known for his chapter on “The state of long-run
expectation” in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) and
Knight for his chapter on “The meaning of risk and uncertainty” in Risk, Uncertainty
and Proﬁt (1921). A central contribution in the cited works of Knight and Keynes is
the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Here is a quotation from Keynes (1937):
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distin-
guish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect
of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only
slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position
of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these mat-
ters there is no scientiﬁc basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know.
This distinction is absent in the expected utility () m o d e lo fd e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
under risk, due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage’s (1954) model
of decision-making under uncertainty, but it is the genesis of Ellsberg’s (1961) seminal
critique of Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility (). In his analysis,
Ellsberg proposes ambiguity or “irreducible uncertainty” as it is called by Keynes, as
another aspect of decision-making under uncertainty. In Ellsberg’s two-color thought
experiment, subjects make pair-wise choices between a risky urn, where the relative
frequencies of the two outcomes are 1/2, and an ambiguous urn, where the relative
frequencies are unknown. In the ﬁrst trial, if the subject chooses an urn and draws
a black ball then she receives $100, the “good” outcome, but if she draws a white
ball then she receives zero dollars, the “bad outcome.” In the second trial the payoﬀs
are reversed. Subjects that choose the ambiguous urn on both trials are said to be
ambiguity-seeking and subjects that choose the risky urn on both trials are said to be
ambiguity-averse. Ambiguity-seeking subjects in the Ellsberg experiment “act as if,”
the perceived probability of the “good” outcome is greater than the relative frequency
of the “good” outcome. Ambiguity-averse subjects in the Ellsberg experiment “act
as if” the perceived probability of the “bad” outcome is greater than the relative
frequency of the “bad” outcome.
The dependence of perceived probabilities on payoﬀs is inconsistent with Savage’s
axiomatic model of decision-making under uncertainty, i.e., subjective expected utility
() theory. See Savage, page 68: “... the view sponsored here does not leave
room for optimism or pessimism to play any role in the person’s judgement,” or
Ellsberg’s (1961) explanation of the two color Ellsberg paradox: “... we would have
2to regard the subject’s subjective probabilities as being dependent upon his payoﬀs,
his evaluation of the outcomes ... it is impossible to infer from the resulting behavior
a set of probabilities for events independent of his payoﬀs.”
In an interesting and provocative experiment, Huettel et al. (2006) test a new
model of decision-making under uncertainty with proxies for risk-aversion and ambiguity-
aversion, consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of the two color Ellsberg paradox,
where agents choose actions and beliefs. The proxies are  for risk-aversion, where
 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion for the utility function ()=,a n d
for ambiguity-aversion in the -maxmin expected utility model. The -maxmin ex-
pected utility of an ambiguous lottery,  =( 1 2) is (1−)(1∨2)+(1∧2).
If  ∈ (01) then  is concave and the subject is risk-averse. If  =1then  is linear
and the subject is risk-neutral. Finally, if 1 then  is convex and the subject
is risk-loving. Huettel et al. interpret  as a measure of ambiguity-aversion, where
 ∈ [005) denotes ambiguity-seeking,  =0 5 is ambiguity-neutral, and  ∈ (051]
denotes ambiguity-averse. The utility of an ambiguous lottery in the Huettel et
al. model is the -maxmin expected utility and the utility of a risky lottery is the
expected utility. Huettel et al. assume that subjects maximize utility in choosing be-
tween a pair of lotteries. Before reviewing their experiment, we show that the Huettel
et al. model is consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of the two-color paradox. The
utility of the risky urn is [(0) + (100)]2 and the utility of the ambiguous urn
is (1 − )(100) + (0),w h e r e(0) = 0. If the agent is ambiguity-averse then
(1 − ) ∈ [005). Hence (100)2  (1 − )(100) and the agent chooses the risky
urn on both trials. If the agent is ambiguity-seeking then (1 − ) ∈ (051]. Hence
(100)2  (1 − )(100) and the agent chooses the ambiguous urn on both trials.
Returning to the experiment of Huettel et al. Using  data from pairwise
choices between risky lotteries, where the probabilities of the payoﬀsa r ek n o w nt ot h e
subjects, and ambiguous lotteries, where the probabilities of the payoﬀsa r eu n k n o w n
to the subjects, Huettel et al. conclude that the neural mechanisms governing choice
under risk and choice under ambiguity are independent. Brieﬂy, they asked 13 sub-
jects to make pair-wise choices between lotteries with diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty,
i.e., certain, risky and ambiguous, and used the  data to identify regions in the
brain that are activated during the choice process. For each subject,  is estimated to
maximize the number of correct predictions in the risky-risky and risky-certain trials,
using the expected utility model. The  data identiﬁed a region of the brain
that is activated during the choice process, call it region  Given the estimated b ,
 for each subject is estimated to maximize the number of correct predictions in the
ambiguous-risky and ambiguous-certain trials , using the -maxmin expected utility
model. The  data identiﬁed a diﬀerent region of the brain that is activated
during this choice process, call it region .M o r e o v e r , is inactive when  is active
and  is inactive when  is inactive. As is common in the neural science literature,
this double dissociation study is interpreted as independence of the two choice
behaviors.
Unfortunately, the estimation procedure in the Huettel et al. study is not iden-
tiﬁed, i.e., there are several values of  and  that maximize the number of correct
3predictions – see the sub-section on Behavioral Data Acquisition and Analysis in
the section on Procedures in Huettel et al. Recently, Levy et al. (2010) oﬀered an
alternative explanation of the hypothesized ﬁnding of diﬀerential activation in parts
of the brain as a consequence of choice under risk and ambiguity. In the Huettel et
al. study subjects were told, ex post, the probabilities deﬁning ambiguous lotteries,
possibly allowing learning of the ambiguous probabilities. In the Levy et al. study,
where subjects were not told the ambiguous probabilities, the levels of neural acti-
vation resulting from choice under risk and ambiguity were comparable. Given the
limitations of the Huettel et al. study, in determining the independence of economic
preferences for risk and ambiguity, it is important to replicate their experiment and
estimate  and  with an econometric model that is identiﬁed, using an experimental
design, as in Levy et al., where subjects are not told the ambiguous probabilities.
To that end, we recast the Huettel et al. model as a random utility model, more
speciﬁcally a mixed logit model. The mixed logit model allows us to estimate a
bivariate distribution over  and  from pair-wise choices between risky and ambigu-
ous lotteries of subjects randomly selected from the population. The random utility
model was ﬁrst proposed in psychology by Thurstone (1927) in a form now called
the binomial probit model, and subsequently introduced in economics by Marschak
(1960) who investigated the properties of choice probabilities for utility functions
subject to random perturbations. McFadden (1974) introduced the conditional logit
model. In the binomial case, this is the well-studied logistic model in biostatistics.
See McFadden’s Nobel Lecture for a brief history of the origins of the random utility
model.
The proxies for ambiguity-aversion and risk-aversion,  and , are treated as
random eﬀects, i.e., random variables uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, in
the mixed logit model presented in this paper. For a detailed discussion of the mixed
l o g i tm o d e ls e ec h a p t e r6 of Train (2009). The following example from McCulloch et
al. (2008) illustrates the diﬀerences between ﬁxed and random eﬀects:
Consider a clinical trial to treat epileptics, in which a drug is administered
at four diﬀerent dose levels.  is the number of seizures experienced by
patient  receiving dose ,w h e r e[]= + ,  is a general mean
and  is the eﬀect on the number of seizures due to treatment .I nt h i s
model of the expected value of ,  and each  are considered ﬁxed
and unknown constants, that we wish to estimate. These are the only
treatments being used and we are considering no others, thus the  are
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Suppose now the clinical trials were conducted at 20 diﬀerent clinics in
New York City, where  is the number of seizures experienced by patient
 receiving treatment at the  the clinic. Now []=+. The clinics
have been chosen randomly with the object of treating them as a repre-
sentation of the population of all clinics in New York City and inferences
can and will be made about that population. This is characteristic of
random eﬀects, thus the  are random eﬀects.
4There are two criteria for using a random eﬀects model in lieu of a ﬁxed eﬀects
model. First, the data is generated by taking a random sample from some ﬁxed
population. Our sample is randomly selected from the population of Yale students,
matriculating in the summer session and fall term of 2009. Second, the explanatory
variables – the payoﬀs and probabilities deﬁning the lotteries — must be uncorrelated
with the random eﬀects,  and  This is certainly true in our experiment in which
the payoﬀs and probabilities deﬁning the lotteries in the pair-wise comparisons are
generated randomly and independently for each subject.
We replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. experiment with 30 randomly
chosen Yale undergraduates. One modiﬁcation is that we asked the subjects to make
some pairwise comparisons between ambiguous lotteries – this was not the case
in the Huettel et al. experiment. In our experiment, each subject makes 200 pair-
wise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries. In the Huettel et al. analysis,
 and  are interpreted as parameters and the choice probability, ,f o r in the
pair-wise comparison between lotteries  and  is deﬁned as the percent correctly
predicted. This is not the case for the mixed logit model that we present. In our
model, the choice probability, ,f o r in the pairwise choices between lotteries
 and  is interpreted as the proportion of individuals in the population, with
the same preferences for risk and ambiguity, that choose  or is interpreted as the
proportion of times that a single individual chooses  in repeated pairwise choices
between options  and . T h i si so u ro t h e rm o d i ﬁcation of the Huettel et al.
experiment.
We interpret  and  as random eﬀects with a bivariate log-normal distribution,
parameterized by unknown hyper-parameters Ψ. Using the Bayesian perspective,
we can ﬁrst estimate Ψ by simulated maximum likelihood and then estimate the
individual random eﬀects  and  for each subject  =1 230, by simulating the
posterior distribution of  and  conditional on the subject’s pair-wise comparisons
of risky and ambiguous lotteries, using Bayes theorem. The posterior means are
consistent estimates of the individual-level random eﬀects,  and  – see chapter
11 of Train (2009) for the details. The Bernstein—von Mises theorem in chapter
12 of Train provides an alternative classical method of estimating the individual-
level random eﬀects. That is, maximum likelihood estimation of  and .T h e
Bernstein—von Mises theorem shows that the Bayesian and classical estimates of the
individual-level random eﬀects  and  are asymptotically equivalent.
We estimate  and  by maximizing the log-likelihood of each subject’s pair-
wise choices in risky and ambiguous lotteries. Following Huettel et al., we use a
two-step procedure to estimate  and  for each subject  =1 230 That is,
our estimator is two-step maximum likelihood estimation. To estimate ,w ea s k
each subject to choose between 40 risky-certain pairs and 40 risky-risky pairs of
lotteries. Here we assume that each subject is maximizing expected utility, which
only depends on .T o e s t i m a t e , we ask each subject to choose between 40
ambiguous-certain pairs and 40 pairs of ambiguous-ambiguous lotteries. Here we
assume that each subject is maximizing -maxmin expected utility, which depends
on both  and , where we use the previously estimated value of  and need only
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conditions for maximum likelihood estimation, but any standard estimator of the
asymptotic covariance matrix for asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood
estimate of  requires a correction. For speciﬁcs, see Theorem 17.8 in Greene (2003)
due to Murphy and Topel (1985). This correction is not necessary under the null
hypothesis that ambiguity and risk are statistically independent.
Treating these estimates as realizations of the random variables  and ,w ee x a m -
ine the correlation, , between  and  by regressing  on . Despite the limitations
of the study reported in Huettel et al. cited above, our results are consistent with their
hypothesized ﬁnding on economic preferences for risk and ambiguity, that the neural
processes governing choice under risk are independent of the neural processes govern-
ing choice under ambiguity. That is, we cannot reject the reject the null hypothesis
that  =0at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
2 The Mixed Logit Model
To replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. experiment, we consider pair-wise
choices in 200 monetary gambles made by 30 randomly chosen Yale undergraduates
in 2009. As in the Huettel et al. experiment, each lottery involves choices between
a known payoﬀ,p a y o ﬀs with known probabilities, and payoﬀs with unknown prob-
abilities. We refer to these lotteries as certain, risky and ambiguous lotteries, re-
spectively. In our experiment, each subject chooses between 40 risky-certain pairs,
40 risky-risky pairs, 40 ambiguous-certain pairs, 40 ambiguous-ambiguous pairs and
40 risky-ambiguous pairs. All ambiguous lotteries have two positive payoﬀsa n da l l
certain lotteries have one positive payoﬀ. In the risky-certain pairs and the risky-
risky pairs, all risky lotteries have one zero payoﬀ and one positive payoﬀ, but in the
risky-ambiguous pairs both ambiguous and risky lotteries have two positive payoﬀs.
Expected values of lotteries are chosen as random, whole-dollar amounts between
$5 and $25, and expected values of pairs of lotteries are matched within 20%. The
probability of winning the amount presented in a certain lottery is always 1, and
the probabilities of winning amounts presented in risky and ambiguous lotteries are
chosen randomly between 0.25 and 0.75, and varied across gambles.
At the start of each trial, subjects are given a pair-wise choice between lotteries,
represented by two pie charts. Subjects are instructed to choose the lottery on the
left or right by typing “”o r“ .” Once a choice is made, a box appears around the
chosen lottery and the other lottery disappears. Finally, the payoﬀ of the lottery is
displayed at the bottom of the screen. Figure 1 displays pairs of risky, certain and
ambiguous lotteries. After completion of 200 trials, subjects are paid winnings from
4 randomly selected trials. Winnings ranged from $0 to $93 in a single trial, and $35
to $99 overall. The results of the experiment are summarized in the appendix. Ex
post, subjects are not told the probability of outcomes in an ambiguous lottery.
Here is a brief description of the parametric mixed logit models we use to analyze
our data. For each pair of risky lotteries:  ≡ (1 2;12) and  ≡ (1 2;12),
 is the probability of choosing ,a n d is the probability of choosing  in a pair-
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(A) Subjects made decisions between pairs of gambles, drawn from
the following types: certain,w i t hak n o w no u t c o m e ;risky,w i t ht w o
outcomes with known probabilities; and ambiguous,w i t ht w o
outcomes with unknown probabilities. Probabilities and reward
values varied across trials, and expected value was roughly
matched between the gambles.
(B) At the beginning of each trial, two gambles were presented and
the subjects indicated their preference by pressing a joystick the subjects indicated their preference by pressing a joystick
button. A square then appeared around the selected gamble.wise comparison between  and  ,w h e r e +  =1 .
To estimate , we use the multiplicative random utility model, where the expected
utility of the risky option  is given by
()=1(1) + 2(2)







(1 + exp[ln()−ln( )])

– see Fosgerau and Bielaire (2009) for a discussion of the multiplicative random
utility model. In our data set, the pairs of risky-certain and risky-risky lotteries,
2 = 2 =0 . Hence the logit choice probability for choosing  as a function of  is
()=
exp[ ln(1)+ln1− ln(1) − ln1]
(1 + exp[ ln(1)+ln1 −  ln(1) − ln1])

We denote the chosen lotteries as  in each pair of 40 risky-certain and 40 risky-
risky lotteries. The likelihood of the observed risky choices in the 80 pair-wise
comparisons{()}
=80


































McFadden has shown that the log-likelihood function with these choice probabil-
ities is globally concave in . Hence the  for ˆ  is identiﬁed. We estimate ˆ  by
numerically maximizing the log-likelihood of the logit choice probabilities.
Our null hypothesis is that economic preferences for risk and ambiguity are inde-
pendent, where  is a measure of the subject’s tolerance for risk and  is a measure of
the subject’s attitude towards ambiguity. The alternative hypothesis is that economic
preferences for risk and ambiguity are correlated. Under the null hypothesis, every
function of  and every function of  are independent. In particular, the  for 
and risky-certain or risky-risky data is independent of the  for  and ambiguous-
certain or ambiguous-ambiguous data, for every ﬁxed value of ,e . g . ,ˆ , the estimate
of .
7To estimate , we use the additive random utility model, where subjects evaluate
ambiguous lotteries, using -maxmin expected utility. Given the pair of ambiguous
lotteries  ≡ (1 2) and  ≡ (1 2), the logit choice probability for choosing 












– see Train (2009) for a discussion of the additive random utility model. We denote
the chosen lotteries as  in each pair of 40 ambiguous-certain and 40 ambiguous-
ambiguous lotteries. The likelihood of the observed ambiguous choices in the 80
pair-wise comparisons {()}
=80

























If ˆ  6=0 , then the log-likelihood function is globally concave in , ˆ  is not
identiﬁed for subjects where ˆ  =0 .T h a t i s , i f ˆ  =0 , then for all ˆ  ∈ [01] :
(ˆ  ˆ )=1 2. Hence ˆ  is indeterminate and the six subjects with indeterminate
ˆ  “act as if” they ﬂip a fair coin to choose between any pair of ambiguous lotteries.
These 6 subjects were excluded from our analysis. The  for  is identiﬁed
for the remaining 24 subjects. We estimate ˆ  for each of these 24 subjects with
the 40 ambiguous-certain and the 40 ambiguous-ambiguous lotteries, by numerically
maximizing the log-likelihood of the logit choice probabilities, for ﬁxed ˆ .
To estimate the correlation between risk and ambiguity, we consider several speci-
ﬁcations. In the ﬁve speciﬁcations, where we exclude the six subjects with unidentiﬁed
ˆ ,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient of the regression is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 0.05
level, indicating linear independence between risk and ambiguity. Hence we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of independence of economic preferences for risk and ambi-
guity. The regression coeﬃcients, regression statistics and conﬁdence intervals are in
the appendix on parametric data analysis. All the statistical and numerical analysis
was done with Matlab. This empirical ﬁnding only shows that risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion are not linearly dependent. Hence we test directly for independence
by constructing a 2 × 2 contingency table, where the columns are labeled ,f o r
ambiguity aversion and , for ambiguity seeking,and the rows are labeled ,f o r
risk averse, and  , for risk seeking. Here is the table, where we have omitted the




We see that the cells in the second column are both zero. Consequently, Prob(|)=
Prob(|)=1 . Hence in our choice experiment it follows from Fisher’s exact test
that risk and ambiguity are independent – see section 4.6 in Lehmann and Romano
(2005).
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4 Appendix: Data Analysis
10Estimation Results 
 
•  Beta measures risk-attitude. 
 
o  Beta < 1: risk-averse. 
 
o  Beta > 1: risk-seeking. 
 
•  Alpha measures ambiguity-attitude. 
 
o  Alpha < 0.5: ambiguity-seeking. 
 
o  Alpha > 0.5: ambiguity-averse.  
 
 
  Subject No.    Beta          Alpha 
 
1          0.8846  risk-averse      0.8031  ambiguity-averse 
 
      2             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 
                  indeterminate 
       
3          1.0600      risk-seeking    0.6750  ambiguity-averse 
 
      4          1.6342      risk-seeking    0.8210  ambiguity-averse 
     
5             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 
                indeterminate 
 
      6          1.1975      risk-seeking    0.8007  ambiguity-averse 
 
      7      1.8955      risk-seeking    0.8504  ambiguity-averse 
 
      8          0.4385      risk-averse    1.0000  ambiguity-averse 
 
      9          2.6677      risk-seeking    0.7104  ambiguity-averse 
 
     10          1.2111      risk-seeking    0.7788  ambiguity-averse 
 
     11          2.7591      risk-seeking    0.8493  ambiguity-averse 
 
     12             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 
                  indeterminate 
 
     13          2.8378      risk-seeking    0.7460  ambiguity-averse 
   Subject No.    Beta          Alpha 
 
     14          1.9467      risk-seeking    0.8322  ambiguity-averse 
   
     15          2.0150      risk-seeking    0.8966  ambiguity-averse 
 
     16          1.5265      risk-seeking    0.7113  ambiguity-averse 
 
     17          2.8376      risk-seeking    0.8056  ambiguity-averse 
 
     18          0.7023      risk-averse    0.8883  ambiguity-averse 
 
     19          2.9604      risk-seeking    0.8521  ambiguity-averse 
 
     20          1.3524      risk-seeking    0.8067  ambiguity-averse 
 
     21          0.4946  risk-averse      1.0000  ambiguity-averse 
    
22             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 
                indeterminate 
 
     23          0.7039      risk-averse    0.9863  ambiguity-averse 
 
     24          1.8134  risk-seeking      0.8421  ambiguity-averse 
 
     25          2.0643  risk-seeking      0.9536  ambiguity-averse 
 
     26          2.3418  risk-seeking      0.8417  ambiguity-averse 
 
     27         1.6675      risk-seeking    0.8341  ambiguity-averse 
 
     28          1.5246      risk-seeking    0.8102  ambiguity-averse 
 
     29             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 
                  indeterminate 
 
     30             0    risk-averse           0    ambiguity-seeking 









Summary Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta 
 
•  6 subjects excluded because their beta is zero. 
 
•  24 out of remaining 24 individuals are ambiguity-averse. 
 
•  Out of 24 ambiguity-averse individuals: 
 
o  5 individuals are risk-averse and ambiguity-averse 
 
o  19 individuals are risk-seeking and ambiguity-averse Regression Analysis 
 
 
Scenario I a: Regression Analysis Including Subjects with Zero Beta 
 
LHS: alpha, RHS: constant, beta 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, beta) 
     
0.3629 
      0.2272 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    0.1849    0.5409 
    0.1196    0.3347 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 


















 Scenario I b: Regression Analysis Including Subjects with Zero Beta 
 
LHS: beta, RHS: constant, alpha 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, alpha) 
 
      0.1693 
      1.7644 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
   -0.4593    0.7980 
    0.9293    2.5996 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 





















 Scenario II a: Regression Analysis Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta 
 
LHS: alpha, RHS: constant, beta 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, beta) 
 
      0.9047 
     -0.0399 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    0.8195    0.9898 
   -0.0859    0.0061 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 






















Scenario II b: Regression Analysis Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta 
 
LHS: beta, RHS: constant, alpha 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, alpha) 
 
      4.3791 
     -3.2127 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    1.2602    7.4980 
   -6.9188    0.4934 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 




















 Scenario III a: Regression Analysis of Log-Representation Excluding 
Subjects with Beta = 0 and Alpha = 1 
 
LHS: log(alpha/(1-alpha)), RHS: constant, log(beta) 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, log(beta)) 
     
1.9250 
     -0.5002 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    1.4139    2.4360 
   -1.2746    0.2743 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 




















 Scenario III b: Regression Analysis of Log-Representation Excluding 
Subjects with Beta = 0 and Alpha = 1 
 
LHS: log(beta), RHS: constant, log(alpha/(1-alpha)) 
 
Regression Coefficients (constant, log(alpha/(1-alpha)) 
 
      0.7826 
     -0.1663 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    0.3118    1.2535 
   -0.4239    0.0912 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 




















 Scenario IV: Regression Analysis of scenario III without Outliers 
 
•  Only regression of log(beta) on constant and log(alpha/(1-alpha)) in 
scenario III a contains outliers. 
•  Outliers are determined according to criterion in MATLAB: 
o  If zero is outside of residual-specific confidence-interval (95%), 
residual is considered an outlier. 
 
LHS: log(alpha/(1-alpha)), RHS: constant, log(beta) 
 
Regression Coefficients(constant, log(beta)) 
     
1.4643 
      0.0199 
 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
 
•  Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding coefficient. 
•  If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
    1.1658    1.7629 
   -0.4268    0.4667 
 
Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test) 
 
•  F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero. 
•  Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05. 
 
    0.0005    0.0088    0.9263 